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BOOK REVIEWS
THE BILL OF RIGATS. By Learned Hand.
1958. Pp. 77. $2.50.

Harvard University Press.

Cambridge:

The Bill of Rights is a concise summary of Judge Hand's philosophy of judicial
review, as embodied in three Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures delivered at Harvard
this year.
The lectures (chapters in the book) are provocatively entitled "When a Court
Should Intervene," "The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," and "The Guardians";
and, as the titles suggest, the theory grows more controversial with each chapter.
The power of the Supreme Court to declare statutes unconstitutional, Judge Hand
concludes, after an analysis reminiscent of the French Theorists of legislative supremacy, is not a logical deduction from the structure of the Constitution, despite
the arguments of Marshall and Hamilton. It is, however, a "practical condition upon
its successful operation." (p. 15). Despite the spurious Holmesian antinomy between
logic and law, we may here agree that Judge Hand is correct: the power of the
Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of statutes is, on one or the other
justification, necessary, and we may also conclude that without Marshall's brilliant
usurpation "the whole system would have collapsed." (p. 29).
In the next two chapters, however, Judge Hand expressses his fear that the
Supreme Court has overextended this acknowledged power. He fears the Court as a
"third legislative chamber," (pp. 42, 55, 70) and a group of "Platonic Guardians,"
(p. 73) whence the title of the last chapter.
He points out the difficulties encountered by the courts with the definition of such
terms as the "police power," and its existentially exhaustive correlative, "violation
of due process," and characterizes the Court's attempt to delineate their respective
boundaries with vague formulae of fairness as "a patent usurpation." (p. 42).
Following the geriatric tendency for security current in the country today, Judge
Hand is distressed at the unpredictability introduced into the law by the Court's
assumed power to annul statutes on the merits even in close cases of controversial
value analysis. (pp. 55, 72).
The Court should restrict its power to declare statutes unconstitutional to "extreme
occasions," he holds. These occasions are nowhere defined. But, as an example of
a case which is not extreme, Judge Hand offers Morey v. Doid,' (p. 45) in which
the Court (in a six to three decision, with Justice Black among the dissenters since
only an economic and not a "preferred" right was involved) set aside an Illinois
statute which, by name, excluded the American Express Company from licensing requirements for money-order companies.
Although Judge Hand's position may give comfort to those who fear a resurgence
of the pre-1937 Court which struck down so much worthwhile economic and social
legislation with the sword of "due process,"' 2 it should be remembered that Judge
Hand rejects (pp. 50-51) the distinction between personal and property rights, refusing to give to the former the "preferred" position which is the only way of making
the Court's recent policy of self-restraint in matters of economic and social legislation
("political questions") consistent with the undiminished scope of its civil rights
protection (the "first amendment rights"). Such a hands-off policy as Judge Hand
recommends would thus effectively emasculate even the first amendment.
1. 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
2. See Schwartz, The Supreme Court 191-98 (1957).
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The Doud case, therefore, presents us with a concrete example on which to choose
between Judge Hand's and more traditional theories of constitutional interpretation. Judge Hand chooses the will of the people as expressed through their legislatures
as supreme: their decision should not be interfered with by the Court, even though
embodied in a statute so patently discriminatory as that in the Doud case. The facile
argument for legislative superiority is rhetorically persuasive. However, the virtue
of the United States Constitution is not solely in the acknowledged vagueness of
such terms as "due process," which allows for its remarkable accommodation to
changed conditions, and hence its perennial vitality, but also in that the Constitution
and its Court represent, in a very special sense, and more so than any ephemeral
legislative enactment, the real will of the American people: their conscience.
It is the beauty of the Constitution and the Court which implements it that the
otherwise helpless individual citizen will be protected from the momentary emotional
excesses of even the overwhelming majority of his fellow citizens. Unlike Judge
Hand, I have enough faith in the American people to believe that such protection
as much represents their will as any statute passed by any legislature.
Obviously, the balance between individual and societal values is always a delicate
one and difficult to appraise, and its primary evaluation resides with the legislature.
As a counsel of prudence to the Court to avoid a hasty substitution of its judgment
for that of the elected representatives of the people, this book is, therefore, worthwhile. On the other hand, as an argument against the Court's power to perform its
customary function of invalidating legislation which fails to meet the standards of
natural justice embodied in the Constitution, even though that decision necessarily
involves the judges' personal opinions of what those standards are, the argument
can only be wholeheartedly rejected.
ROBERT A. KESSLERt

EDMUND Bu=xE AND THE NATURAL LAW. By Peter J. Stanlis.
Michigan Press. Ann Arbor: 1958. Pp. 311. $5.75.

University of

No writer, remarked Leslie Stephen, has received or deserved more splendid
panegyrics than Edmund Burke, who has "endured," added Harold Laski, "as the
permanent manual of political wisdom without which statesmen are as sailors on
an uncharted sea." Noble praise this, which might be taken as proof positive of
Laski's having satisfied William Hazlitt's requirement: "It has always been with me
a test of the sense and candour of anyone belonging to the opposite party, whether
he allowed Burke to be a great man"; that is, it might have been so taken had not
Laski utterly misconceived Burke's position as fundamentally utilitarian and pragmatic. So also did G. K. Chesterton, who, misled by the revolutionary "natural
Tights" eloquently rejected by Burke, denounced him as "the atheist," praised
Robespierre as "the theist." Like men of greater scholarly pretension and less humane
wisdom, Chesterton in an atmosphere of positivistic scholarship had misread Burke
as well as the writings of Henry Buckle, Leslie Stephen, W. E. H. Lecky, and John
Morley. Their influence extended also to Charles E., Vaughan, Elie Hal6vy, John
MacCunn, George Sabine, F. J. C. Hearnshaw, and has' found its most recent expression in the pronouncement of Professor Oscar Handlin of Harvard: "Intellectually, the weightiest attacks upon the conception of a natural and universal law
took their points of 'departure in the writings of Burke and Montesquieu." In
Chesterton's judgment on Burke there speaks not merely his most unfortunate
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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paradox, but the failure of a century of scholarship against which have been raised,
from time to time, the intermittent protests of Lord Percy of Newcastle, Russell
Kirk, Leo Strauss, Ross S. J. Hoffman, and Paul Levack. However, their shrewd
and perceptive comments have been only intimations of the full scale study,
the best ever written on Burke's political thought, by Professor Peter J. Stanlis of
the University of Detroit.
Dr. Stanlis' Edmund Burke and the Natural Law is more than the negation of
the positivistic interpretation of Burke; it is rather an incontrovertible demonstration
of his thesis that Burke, "far from being an enemy of the Natural Law, . . . was one
of the most eloquent and profound defenders of Natural Law morality and politics
in Western civilization," and that "the true nature of Burke's cardinal political
principles cannot be understood apart from its connection with the Natural Law."
To advance such a thesis against the cumulative forces of a petrified scholarly
tradition requires of Dr. Stanlis more than mere boldness; it demands not merely
a thorough and intensive reading of Burke against the great historical events of
his age, but a comprehensive and philosophical grasp of the great traditions of the
Natural Law.
These Dr. Stanlis deftly traces. To the time of Hobbes in the mid-seventeenth
century, the Natural Law had been regarded as "an emanation of God's reason and
will, revealed to all mankind," providing a universal ethical norm apparent to "right
reason" and sharply distinguished from the positive laws which "were the products
of man's reason and will and applied only to members of particular communities."
For the pivotal century which followed him, Hobbes' philosophy was the watershed
and the ultimate source of the revolutionary "natural rights." Not only did Hobbes
transfer the origin of Natural Law from God to an a priori "state of nature," but
he wrought a revolution in human psychology, establishing a mechanistic conception
of man that "made him out to be an a-social individualist whose nature existed prior
to the state, and whose membership in society was voluntaristic." Although it has
long been the popularly accepted supposition that Hobbes' successor, John Locke,
reacted vigorously against the philosopher of Malmesbury and reverted to the
Natural Law tradition stemming from Aristotle and flowing through Cicero, Aquinas.
and Hooker, the hard fact is that Locke presents rather a softened and modified
version of the Hobbesian position, substituting for Hobbes' "fear of death" the
more seductive correlative of the desire for pleasure, thus extending Hobbes' identification of the Natural Law with self-interest and perpetuating the confusion of
powers with rights and exalting "private will above normative law." With Locke,
the Natural Law becomes grounded in private reason, and its grand tradition is
not so much destroyed as it is rather utterly confounded, thus passing into the
intellectual currents of the eighteenth century.
Against this backdrop of a Natural 'Law tradition almost hopelessly distorted and
perverted, Dr. Stanlis proceeds to examine Burke's politics in relation to the Natural
Law; to limn his encyclopedic knowledge of its classic statements in Aristotle,
Cicero (especially), Hooker, Suarez, Puffendorf and Grotius; and to sketch his
massive reading in political and legal history, his thorough knowledge of English common law and his awareness that the common law is not to be identified with but does
have a reciprocal relationship with the Natural Law. Yet even more important than
Burke's thorough knowledge and understanding of the Natural Law principles is the
unremitting consistency with which he applied them in the arena of practical, day-today politics throughout his long and distinguished parliamentary career and in his
political writing from 1761 through 1797, in the crucial issues of his age; in his attack upon the repressive English commercial policy toward Ireland, the Popery
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Laws, the economic and civil disabilities imposed upon the Irish; in American affairs,
where Burke's appeal to the Natural Law is "almost always indirect, through the
British constitution, which was for him merely the practical means of guaranteeing
the 'rights' of Natural Law throughout the empire"; in the constitutional crisis precipitated by the Middiesex election of 1768; in the trial of Warren Hastings; and, of
course, in his writings and speeches on the French Revolution. By'apt quotation,
thorough analysis, cogent interpretation, Dr. Stanlis establishes the undeniable consistency of Burke's adherence to the Natural Law as well as his careful and perpetual distinction between the Natural Law and the chartered rights of men which
have no validity unless they rest, ultimately, on the Natural Law.
If anything remains to be said about Burke and the Natural Law, it is the unravelling of the mystery of how a century of scholars, by no means illiterate men,
could have been misled into the supposition that Burke was a pre-Benthamite and
a forerunner of Mill. Something of their confusion can be attributed to the conceptions current, in the eighteenth century, of the Natural Law, and something
also to their readiness to read into Burke their own conceptions. Because the
revolutionary "natural rights" which Burke had attacked were "abstract," they
hastily concluded that he opposed all theory and all speculation, despite his protest:
"I do not vilify theory and speculation-no, because that would be to vilify reason
itself." At the same time, they eagerly noted and underscored Burke's constant
appeals to "expediency," "circumstances," "diversity," "moderation," "practical results," and "prudence," all of which to the positivist mind betokened Burke's groping
toward utilitarianism and his opposition, like their own, to the eighteenth century
shell of the Natural Law tradition. True, Burke's conception of the Natural Law
was not that more popular and widespread conception promulgated by Puffendorf and
other seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers who regarded Natural Law
principles, like those of contemporary mathematics, as foreover fixed and as being
applicable "to political problems by a literal-minded, rule-of-thumb process . . .
without equity or legal temperance." Having themselves been hopelessly separated
from the pre Hobbesian Natural Law tradition to which Burke had reverted, and
observing in him his obvious rejection of the dry husk of a lifeless tradition into
which it had withered, the positivist historians concluded that he was their forerunner.

Nothing could have been further from the truth. As Dr. Stanlis makes evident,
it was not the utilitarian school which Burke anticipated; it was rather "the classical
and Scholastic Natural Law of Cicero and, Hooker" to which he had returned.
Beyond the specious appeal of nature's simple plan and over the remains of Hobbes
and Locke, Burke had snatched an insight more profound and complex of man and
society, a vision which he never lost. Intensely, humbly, genuinely aware of the
proliferating variety and diversity of God's creation, Burke steadfastly opposed all
attempts to impose abstractions upon society. He would readily have agreed with
St. Thomas that "laws are laid down for human acts dealing with singular and contingent matters which have infinite variations. To make a rule fit every case is
impossible." Hence, in the grand tradition, Burke could only oppose, vehemently
and magniloquently, that speculative dialectic of revolutionary "natural right," lavish
in the promise which it could never fulfill to reorder society according to its rationalistic blue print, irrespective of the infinite combinations and diversities imposed
upon the human race by specific times and places in its history. Adamantly opposed
to revolutionary eruption, Burke yet acknowledged change as the great law of nature,
but change guided by the doctrine of prescription and a sense of historical continuity,
directed by a circumspect prudence and with constant reference to the Natural Law.
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In the unfolding of history, Burke divined the manifestation of the Natural Law
that for him, as for Cicero and Hooker before him, emanated from God, a living
Natural Law whose life demanded development. No mere defender of the ancien
regime, as Tom Paine chose ludicrously to depict him, neither did Burke anticipate,
as some (Schlegel ,and Taine's followers) have opined, the Heracleitan flux of the
Hegalians. "History," he once remarked, "is a preceptor of prudence, not of principles."
Burke's guiding principles, as Dr. Stanlis has demonstrated, were those of the
Natural Law. If Burke found their manifestation in the march of history and not
in the airy abstraction of the philosophes, if he regarded them as "useful," then it
was because for him they were as real and living as the God from whom they
emanated and as the men whom He had created and for whom He had intended the
Natural Law. So it is that in Burke "there is almost always an attempt to show that
true theory is embodied in practice, that although moral principles may be stated in
abstract terms they become meaningful only when applied in specific situations."
In brief, such are moral principles and the nature of men that their observation of
these principles will ultimately, if only incidentally, prove to be of the highest usefulness to them. So Dr. Stanlis justly remarks that Burke "believed the reverse of
Lecky's statement that 'all morals spring from and depend on utility.' To Burke a
law or action was not good because it was useful, but utility was merely one of
several positive social consequences of morality."
In reclaiming Edmund Burke for the great pre-Hobbesian tradition of the Natural
Law, Dr. Stanlis has successfully sustained his important thesis, has forever reversed
a century of positivistic scholarship, and has laid, for all time, that old ghost of
Burke's alleged utilitarianism. He has written the definitive study of a major political
and literary figure in the great mainstream of Christian humanism. He has done for
Burke what Louis Bredvold did for Dryden, George Sherburn for Pope, Ricardo
Quintana for Swift. Edmund Burke and the Natural Law is a landmark of high
literary scholarship, but it is no book for the mere antiquarian. As Ross S. J. Hoffman and Paul Levack reminded us nearly ten years ago, since 1917 "men have
experienced anew the kind of universal tumult in which Burke lived; and he has
become relevant again." Burke is indeed relevant because the Natural Law which
Dr. Stanlis has laid bare at the heart of Burke's politics is perennially relevant, and
never more so than now, when the bankruptcy of latter-day political thought, stemming from Bentham and Mill, is everywhere painfully manifest. Thus perplexed and
distressed, the twentieth century could well profit from Burke's own example and
return, as did he, to the great tradition of the Natural Law, whose most eloquent
advocate and exemplar he happens to be. In his thought, in a sense far deeper than
any conceived or intended by Professor Laski, there is indeed the "permanent manual
of political wisdom," and for that "manual" there is at long last the indispensable
guide in Peter Stanlis' Edmund Burke and the Natural Law.
WARREN L. FLEISCHAtTERt

t

Assistant Professor of English, John Carroll University.
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A TREATiSE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. By Samuel Williston, 3d ed. Walter
H. E. Jaeger. Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., Mt. Kisco: 1957. Vol. 1. Pp. xxii,

826. $20.00.
One of the most difficult and, in a way, thankless tasks in the field of legal writing
is that of editing a new edition of a treatise by one of the acknowledged authorities.
Little can be added by an editor to the luster of Williston, Scott, Bogert, Mechem
and others. By the same token, little of that luster automatically devolves upon
the editor of a subsequent edition. Yet, the work that goes into the later editions
must be as painstaking and imaginative as that which went into the original.
With this statement of the difficulties in mind, tribute must be paid to the work of
Walter H. E. Jaeger on the third edition of Williston's A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts, the first volume of which was recently published. The Williston presentation is scrupulously followed, but Professor Jaeger has not been bound by the past
to the neglect of the present. He has skillfully deleted, added, and made minor reorganizations where necessary, either for clarity or to bring the statement of the law
up to date.
Format, make-up, and type face are perhaps not the first thing that should be
noticed or commented upon when one opens so important a work as the new
Williston for review. Yet lawyers, whose eyes must have long been thought indestructible by publishers, and whose reading skills must long have been thought
to need no assistance from the graphic arts, are ever appreciative of the improvements
that are being made-and the typographical presentation of this third edition is
worthy of comment. The type is extremely legible; the use of bold-faced numbers
for the footnotes makes them easy to locate; and the use of short paragraphs, both
in the text and in the footnotes, facilitates reading and use of the book for reference.
These improvements serve a very practical purpose in helping -the lawyer, educator,
and student accomplish more in his working hours, and in leaving him less exhausted
when he finishes.
Professor Jaeger's most signal personal contribution to the new volume may well
be in his work on the footnotes. They have, of course, been brought up to date;
but, more important, they have in many instances been greatly expanded. Few
cases are cited without a clear indication of the reason. Professor Jaeger in his
preface comments on the liberal quotation of pertinent language from court opinions,
and on the use of "terse digests" to elucidate the reasons for citing the particular
cases. To be sure these techniques are not new and both were used in the earlier
editions of Williston. Professor Jaeger has, however, used them skillfully in the new
volume. He seems also to have eliminated from the footnotes references that are,
for one reason or another, now obsolete.
Turning to the text, the first volume covers eight of the twelve chapters that were
the subject of the first volume of the second edition-Definition of Terms; Requisites
of Informal Contracts; Making of Offers; Duration and Termination of Offers;
Acceptance of Offers; Consideration; Promises Without Assent or Consideration; and
Formation of Formal Contracts. New material that appears in these chapters deals
with new subjects or with subjects that have increased in importance since the year
1936, when the second edition appeared. A brief new section "Consideration alqd
Tax Statutes," for instance, calls attention to the effect that tax legislation, particularly the gift tax statutes, have had on the concept of adequate consideration.
In -the section -on "Bonus, Pension and Other Benefits," a new paragraph discusses
continued service in response to an offer of a pension or similar benefit as consideration to make the offer enforceable. Again in the chapter on consideration Professor
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Jaeger in new sections discusses the differences between lack of and failure of consideration and the "growing tendency" toward contracts to make wills.
An even more significant departure and contribution to the third edition is in the
expansion of the discussion of options in relation to irrevocable offers. Material from
the second edition has been divided into separate sections for clarity, and sections
refining the definition of options and discussing the exercise of options have been
added. New sections, these in Chapter 8, "Formation of Formal Contracts," discuss
bail, penal and other conditional bonds, in relation to recogriizances; and government,
municipal, and private bonds, in their contractual aspects and as to their negotiability.
Numerous other changes and additions have been made in the text to reflect not
only the developments in contract law itself, but also the effect on that law of sociological and scientific changes during the past twenty years. Section headings have
been improved, streamlined, to make them more readable and, in many instances,
more clearly indicative of the subject matter covered. The order of sections within
the chapters has been preserved, except as sections have been divided or added; and
the numbering of the sections has also been preserved. This makes it possible for
the lawyer or student to use the index to the second edition with the volumes of the
third as they appear. New material is not, of course, found in the index to the
second edition, but it can easily be found through the detailed table of contents as
it will appear in each volume.
A glance at the condensed table of contents for the entire treatise, as it appears
in Volume 1, indicates some rearrangement in the subject matter of the chapters,
but apparently this will not result in a rearrangement of sections. Volume 9 of the
second edition, dealing with war contracts and published in '1945, will probably be
absorbed into a new chapter, Chapter 61. entitled "Government Contracts."
In all, Professor Whiteside's comment on the first edition, made in his review
of the second edition, seems applicable to the third. Professor Whiteside said:
Practitioners have relied on its remarkably accurate statement of the law; judges
have enriched their opinions from its masterly exposition; and teachers and students
have found within its pages a story of the law's development together with a critical
discussion of its foundations and an analysis of its reasoning.'
GEORGE P. LAMB AND
CARRINGTON SH ELDSt
1.

Whiteside, Williston on Contracts: A Review, 23 Cornell L.Q. 269 (1938).
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